In this paper, we study bilateral mergers in Cournot markets with initially three or four …rms. Theory predicts pre-and post-merger total output well. However, merged …rms produce signi…cantly more than …rms without a merger history. As a result, mergers are not as unpro…table as predicted. By analyzing two control treatments, we provide an explanation for these results based on the notion of aspiration levels.
Introduction
Two key economic questions arise when …rms plan to merge. First, from the perspective of the …rms involved, how the merger will a¤ect their joint pro…ts, and, second, from a policy perspective, how it will a¤ect overall welfare. Both these questions have been the focus of much theoretical and empirical research. Issues such as the internal organization of …rms, production cost savings, or other types of scale economies have been put forward to explain why mergers could be pro…table (see, e.g., Perry and Porter, 1985) , and asymmetries between …rms may be a reason that mergers can increase welfare (see Farrell and Shapiro, 1990 ).
However, theoretical analysis has also highlighted the fact that a merger can be disadvantageous for the merging …rms under quite plausible market conditions. This point has been made most prominently in a paper by Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) who show that bilateral mergers in Cournot markets with homogenous products and constant returns to scale cannot be pro…table. The reason for this result, which has triggered a wide literature, 1 is intuitive and seemingly robust. Starting from a market with n identical …rms, suppose that two …rms merge. This reduces the number of …rms to n ¡ 1; increasing industry concentration and total industry pro…ts, and reducing welfare. However, while the two …rms which merged received a share of 2=n of the pre merger industry pro…ts, they receive only a share of 1=(n ¡ 1) of post merger industry pro…ts and this makes the merger unpro…table-excepting where two …rms create a monopoly through merger. This result poses a puzzle similar to the bargaining paradox introduced by Harsanyi (1977, p.203n.) . 2 Two …rms which were formerly competitors join forces. They perfectly coordinate their actions and pursue the same common objective. But, although they act jointly and pursue joint interests, and although the set of their other competitors has not changed, they lose while their competitors win. The puzzle is resolved if the underlying logic of the market game is considered. The merger does not generate one 'big' or 'powerful' new competitor. Instead, the merger simply eliminates one of the merging …rms completely.
Whether or not this merger puzzle holds empirically, thus depends crucially on 1 See, e.g., Deneckere and Davidson (1985) , Gaudet and Salant (1991) and the literature cited there. 2 The bargaining paradox describes a situation in which n players bargain about the division of a pie among themselves and compares this situation with one in which two players enter into a coalition and act as one (united) player. While the two players typically receive 2=n when acting independently, they receive only 1=(n ¡ 1) if they act jointly.
whether the merger is perceived as identical with a simple reduction in the number of …rms, or whether the competitor created by the merger is perceived as di¤erent from the other …rms. The true perception may depend on properties of the production technology like …rms' cost savings from merging, or sunk capacity choices, but may also depend on the competitors' psychology.
Field evidence on mergers is mixed. Let us just focus on the two central questions,
pro…ts of the merging …rms 3 and total welfare. With respect to the former, there are, on the one hand, event studies which investigate the stock market value of the merging …rms before and after a merger. Most of these studies …nd that mergers improve the aggregate stock market value of the merging …rms (see, for a discussion, Jarrel, Brickley and Netter, 1988, or Fridlofsson and Stennek, 1999) . On the other hand, there is the empirical industrial organization literature which analyses the long-run performance of merging …rms. Here, the result is often that mergers reduce pro…tability (see Mueller, 1980, or Scherer and Ross, 1990) , although sometimes positive performance is found (e.g. in Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992) . In a recent study Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2000) report both pro…table and unpro…table mergers, and try to classify them. At the same time, they report that, in contrast to the above, mergers reduced the shareholder value.
With respect to welfare, the picture is even less clear as consumer rents are hard to measure. 4 The Federal Trade Commission (1999) sums up the existing evidence by claiming that "most" mergers would bene…t consumers while "some" are likely to cause adverse e¤ects. As an example of the latter, they mention the attempt by Staples, a retailer of o¢ce supplies, to acquire its competitor O¢ce Depot. By blocking this merger, the FTC claim to have saved consumers $1.1 billion over …ve years. At the other end of the spectrum, Pesendorfer (2000) provides an example of massive welfare gains. The consolidation in the US paper industry in the 1980s, it reports, would have caused annual welfare gains of $875.2 million.
The mixed evidence is probably not very surprising as merger …eld data are notoriously messy-to the extent that some authors question the appropriateness of event studies which are, as pointed out above, a popular tool in empirical merger studies. 5 In view of these problems, we propose an experimental analysis of mergers. Experimental methods can isolate the e¤ect of a merger from other changes in market parameters and seem, therefore, particularly well suited to shedding some light on both the predictive power of non-cooperative merger models and the actual forces shaping market outcomes.
There is some experimental evidence on horizontal mergers in laboratory markets. 6 On the one hand, there is the "cross-sectional" approach where markets with di¤erent numbers of competitors are compared in between subject designs. Such "pure number e¤ects" have been studied, for example, by Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and, more recently, by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) . Our approach is di¤erent as we implement bilateral mergers in markets that have been in existence for a while. This allows us to observe the same group of subjects before and after the merger. Relying on this within subjects design, our hypothesis is that markets with a merger history perform di¤erently from markets in which a merger has not occurred, even if both have the same number of …rms.
Experiments with this property include several papers by Davis and his coauthors. Davis and Holt (1994) study posted-o¤er markets with initially …ve …rms. The merger involves three …rms, but market power is held constant by design. They …nd a signi…-cant e¤ect of the merger which is, however, relatively small. Davis and Wilson (1998) also analyze posted-o¤er markets, but their experiments involve reallocation of plant capacity among …rms which may or may not create market power. While this is not literally a complete merger, the design is very useful in that it illustrates how cost savings can interact with market power. Finally, and Davis and van Boening (2000) analyze mergers in markets with di¤erentiated products. The experiments are designed to examine the behavioral relevance of the Antitrust Litigation Model that U.S. authorities use to help determine the impact of mergers in markets with di¤erentiated products. Their results highlight the role of price vs. quantity competition and that of di¤erent information conditions which in ‡uence the impact of mergers.
In this paper, we study experimental bilateral mergers in a model that is as close as possible to the analytical framework of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983). We consider linear, symmetric three and four …rm experimental Cournot markets and a duopoly control treatment. For the …rst half of the experiment, subjects play a standard Cournot laboratory market. Then two of the players consolidate and the second half 6 For an experimental analysis of vertical mergers, see Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001) .
of the experiment begins.
Our …rst result relates to the predictive power of the Cournot model more generally. As with other studies of Cournot markets, 7 we …nd some collusion in duopoly markets such that total output is below the Cournot level. But, with three or four …rms, the standard Cournot model predicts total output remarkably well. Also, the adjustments in quantities that players make in response to a merger are clearly anti-competitive and, insofar, in line with the predictions. But in one important aspect our results depart from the theory. The linear Cournot model predicts no di¤erences between a merged …rm and its competitors. With constant returns to scale, the merged …rm has no cost advantage over its competitors. Hence, the remaining …rms are symmetric and are predicted to produce equal outputs. 8 But our data draw a di¤erent picture. Post merger markets are not symmetric. Merged …rms produce systematically more than predicted, their competitors systematically less. This yields a striking e¤ect: the pro…ts of the merging …rms are not reduced as drastically as predicted. On the contrary, the merging …rms may even experience a transitory increase in pro…ts in the short run and, in larger markets, they are roughly able to maintain their original pro…ts (prior to merger) in the long run.
We present three possible explanations for this result, all of which allude to a speci…c form of what we shall call merger psychology: (a) the mere fact that one …rm has resulted from a merger renders the …rm "strong" and the whole market asymmetric; (b) as the merged …rms are jointly owned (and pro…ts are to be shared), fairness considerations shift output (and therefore pro…ts) from unmerged to merged …rms; (c) merged …rms are committed to maintaining their original pro…ts because of aspiration levels created in the pre merger markets. To discriminate between these possible explanations, we conduct two further treatments which allow us to rule out explanations (a) and (b). Thus, we are left with a result that is reminiscent of early work by Cyert and March (1956) who-drawing on Simon's work 9 -argued that …rms' behavior is guided by an "acceptable-level pro…t norm" and provided empirical evidence that …rms with declining market shares strive harder to increase sales than others.
Summarizing, with respect to the two questions we started with, we …nd that mergers are not as unpro…table as predicted but that they do indeed reduce welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present 7 A survey can be found in Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2001). 8 It is this very fact which makes mergers non-pro…table. 9 See, e.g., Simon (1955 and 1959) .
the theoretical predictions and the experimental design. Section 3 contains the data analysis and main results. Section 4 relates our …ndings to the literature on aspiration levels and discusses implications for mergers. Section 5 concludes.
Theory and experimental design
In a series of computerized 10 experiments, we studied bilateral mergers in symmetric n-…rm Cournot oligopoly markets. For all markets we used the following demand and cost functions. The demand side of the market was modelled with the computer buying all supplied units according to the inverse demand function
with Q = P n i=1 q i denoting total quantity, and q i denoting …rm i's quantity. The cost function for each seller was simply
that is, marginal cost was constant and equal to one.
It is straightforward to derive the Nash equilibrium for this market. The individual equilibrium output is
and the equilibrium pro…t is
Alternative benchmark outcomes are the joint pro…t maximum and the competitive equilibrium. The symmetric collusive output for a …rm is q c i = 99=2n; and price equals marginal cost if each …rm produces q w i = 99=n: Subjects could choose quantities from a …nite grid between 0 and 100, with .01 as the smallest step. Hence, the action space had a su¢ciently …ne grid for continuous action spaces to be approximated. Therefore, the above benchmarks are also valid in the experiment. 11 Treatment subjects periods description "4!3" 4 2£25 2 out of 4 …rms merge after 25 periods 2 subjects share pro…ts post merger "3!2" 3 2£25 2 out of 3 …rms merge after 25 periods 2 subjects share pro…ts post merger "2const" 2 25 2-…rm control treatment standard Cournot duopoly "4!3GO" 4 2£25 2 out of 4 …rms merge after 25 periods 1 subject gets post merger pro…t, 1 leaves the lab "3 + 1" 4 25 3 …rms, pro…t of one …rm is shared by two subjects Table 1 : Treatments.
Subjects had information about demand and cost conditions so they could calculate best replies to the quantities of the other …rms. This information was provided verbally (see the Appendix) and in the form of a 'pro…t calculator'. The pro…t calculator worked as follows. When fed with data regarding the other …rms (total quantities of the other …rms), the calculator allowed the consequences of own actions to be tried out. Note that a pro…t calculator gives qualitatively the same information as a pro…t table which is often provided in Cournot experiments (e.g., Holt, 1985) . However, the pro…t calculator might help to avoid a bias due to the subjects' limited computational capabilities. After each period, subjects were informed about their own quantity and pro…t and the aggregate quantity their competitors produced. 12 We studied bilateral mergers in markets with initially four and three …rms (treatments "4!3" and "3!2"). Additionally, we ran a duopoly control treatment ("2const").
The duopoly control treatment consisted of 25 rounds only. In both merger treatments, subjects were informed that the experiment would consist of two phases, each comprising 25 rounds. They were, however, not told what would happen after the …rst phase. After round 25 they received a new set of instructions informing them that a merger would occur. Table 1 summarizes the design of our treatments (the treatments "4!3GO" and "3 + 1" will be introduced below).
The merger was conducted as follows. The …rms that merged were chosen randomly.
One of the subjects involved in the merger became responsible for making all actual decisions, while the other remained in the lab and was able to send messages to his or 1 2 Note that this informational condition was not suitable for identifying individual quantities and pro…ts. Among various di¤erent informational conditions, this setup led to outcomes which came closest to the Nash prediction in the four …rm oligopolies in Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (1999 Oechssler ( , 2000 .
her partner. 13 The instructions made it clear that these messages were not binding.
We allowed for these messages in order to keep the passive subject somewhat involved in the decision process. Pro…ts were shared equally between the two of them and this was known to all participants.
Theoretically, behavior in each round of all treatments should depend only on the number of …rms, i.e., one would expect to observe similar data in, say, the second phase of the treatment "3!2" and the duopoly control treatment. Therefore, from (2), the prediction for industry output is simply Q(n) = 99n=(n + 1):
All experiments were conducted at Humboldt University between Spring 2000 and Spring 2001. We conducted six markets for each treatment. The six duopolies were run in one session. We had 2 sessions for each of the treatments "4!3" and "3!2".
Subjects were randomly allocated to computer terminals in the lab so that they could not infer with whom they would interact in a group. 102 subjects participated in this study including two additional control sessions which we will elaborate on below.
Recruited via telephone and e-mail, subjects were students from various departments.
We varied the exchange rates such that, depending on the number of …rms, subjects would have made identical earnings at Nash equilibrium play. The average payo¤ was about DM 39.50 (at the time of the experiment roughly $20). Sessions for treatments "4!3" and "3!2" lasted about 90 minutes, the session for treatment "2const" about 50 minutes including instruction time.
Instructions (see the Appendix) were written on paper and distributed in the beginning of each session. After the instructions were read, we explained the di¤erent windows of the computer screen. When subjects were familiar with both the rules and the handling of the computer program, we started the …rst round.
Experimental results
We present our results in several parts. In the …rst part, we focus exclusively on total output. Given, as assumed, constant marginal and average cost, total output perfectly measures the degree of competition and total welfare. In the second part, we analyze …rms' quantity setting behavior, focussing on the importance of merger history. Table 2 provides essential summary statistics of our experimental results. It shows total output predicted by theory as well as means observed in the experiment, classi…ed by the last third before the merger and the …rst and the last third post merger.
Total outputs
14 Recall that the duopoly market (treatment "2const") serves as a control market that lasted for only 25 rounds. Therefore, only average total quantity in the last third of this market is shown in Table 2 . Note that, unless we explicitly state otherwise, in all subsequent statistical tests of this section we take one group's average total output as one observation.
We focus on the behavior in the last third of the …rst phase (pre merger) and the …rst and the last third of the second phase (post merger). This serves two purposes: Firstly, we can analyze experienced, long-run behavior by comparing the last thirds in which behavior has settled down. Secondly, by comparing the last third of the …rst phase and the …rst third of the second phase, we can analyze the (potentially transient)
short-run e¤ects of the changes induced by the merger. As a …rst step, we analyze whether markets in the …rst phase, i.e., prior to merger, converge to the prediction. We answer this question by comparing observed average total output in the last third of the …rst phase with the numbers predicted by theory. Consider treatment "2const". Here, predicted industry output is 66.67, whereas we observe on average 60.01 units of output. This implies that our experimental duopoly markets are signi…cantly more collusive than theory predicts. 15 Next, consider the markets with three or four …rms prior to merger. Whereas the triopoly pre merger market is slightly less competitive than predicted (72.96 vs. 75.00), we …nd that the quadropoly pre merger market is slightly more competitive than predicted (81.17 vs.
79.20). Moreover, comparing total outputs in the quadropoly pre merger markets with those in the triopoly markets (81.17 vs. 72.96) and the latter, in turn, with those in the duopolies (72.96 vs. 60.01), we …nd that "number e¤ects" are prevalent and statistically signi…cant. 16 We summarize these results as follows
Result 1
The experimental duopoly markets are more collusive than predicted. Total outputs in the three and four …rm pre merger markets are close to the prediction. Now consider the short-run e¤ects induced by the merger. We compare average total quantities in the …rst third after the merger with those observed in the last third before the merger (treatments "3!2" and "4!3"). Inspecting Table 2 , we …nd that, immediately after the merger, total quantity in both markets drops drastically-from 72.96 to 63.27 in treatment "3!2" and from 81.17 to 70.34 in treatment "4!3". In both cases, this decline in industry output is statistically signi…cant. 17 Moreover, in both markets, total output drops to a value below the new Nash equilibrium prediction.
Therefore, we have
Result 2 In both markets the short-run e¤ect of merger is more drastic than predicted:
Total output drops below the Nash level.
Given some time for adjustment, subjects' play may di¤er from that in the …rst third. Therefore, it seems warranted to have a look at the long-run e¤ects induced by the merger. Here, we compare average total quantities in the last third post merger with those observed in the last third prior to merger. Inspecting Table 2 again, we see that, during the second phase of the experiment, total quantities rise in both treatments. In fact, in both cases they converge to a value close to the Cournot prediction. In treatment "3!2" average total output converges to 67.70 in the last third of the second phase where theory predicts an output of 66.67; in treatment 1 5 One-sided Binomial test (p = :017). Our …nding is consistent with results in Holt (1985) or Huck, Müller, and Normann (2001) who report that collusion frequently occurs in repeated Cournot settings with …xed pairs of participants. 1 6 Using one-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests, the p-levels are :0125 and .008; respectively. 1 7 At p = :023 in treatment "3!2" and at p = :014 in treatment "4!3" (one-tailed Wilcoxon test).
"4!3" average total output converges to 75.12 where theory predicts an output of 75.00. However, although quantities are rising, we …nd that average industry output in the last third after the merger is still signi…cantly lower than average industry output in the last third before the merger. 18 Summarizing we have
Result 3
The long-run e¤ects induced by a merger are in line with the prediction as average total quantities decrease from a value around the Nash equilibrium with n …rms to a value that is close to the Nash equilibrium with n ¡ 1 …rms.
As argued in the introduction, we maintain that a market with a merger history may perform di¤erently than one without a merger. If this is true at the aggregate level, output in post merger markets (last third) should be di¤erent from the output in pre merger markets (last third) with the same number of …rms. However, the result above already indicates that this does not hold for three …rms. Our experimental triopoly markets emerging from a merger do produce on average higher total outputs than triopoly markets without a merger history (75.12 vs. 72.96), but these di¤erences are not signi…cant. 19 Strikingly, with duopoly, we do …nd a stronger e¤ect. From Table   2 , we observe that duopoly markets emerging from a merger are more competitive than the duopoly markets without a merger history (67.60 vs. 60.01). And this di¤erence is signi…cant. 20 We summarize by Result 4 Duopoly markets emerging from a merger are signi…cantly more competitive than duopoly markets without merger history. This does not hold for triopoly markets.
The …rst part of this result indicates that our hypothesis, that history may matter, could indeed be relevant. Therefore, we turn in the next subsection to the analysis of …rms' individual behavior.
Individual outputs
The central question in this subsection is: does merger history matter at the …rm level? Is merger perceived as something that is equivalent to the exit of one …rm, or does the fact that one of the remaining …rms is generated by the fusion of two …rms distinguish this …rm from the others? Table 3 Table 3 : Average individual quantities of (un)merged …rms.
1. In post merger situations, the merged …rms choose higher quantities than …rms that have not been merged. This result is immediate from Table 3 . For both treatments "4!3" and "3!2" we …nd that this result holds across the entire postmerger phase. In the …rst third, there are signi…cant di¤erences between merged and non-merged …rms. In the last third, however, the gap in average output is slightly smaller than in the …rst third and is no longer signi…cant in treatment "3!2". However, di¤erences in treatment "4!3" are still signi…cant. 21 2. Merged …rms also produce higher quantities than …rms in markets with no merger history but the same number of competitors. More speci…cally, we compare the …rst and the last third of "3!2" post merger with the last third of "2const". And we compare the …rst and the last third of "4!3" post merger with the last third "3!2" prior to merger. In all four cases, the merged …rm produces signi…cantly more than a …rm in a theoretically equivalent market without merger history. 22 3. Unmerged …rms in (post merger) markets with three …rms produce slightly less than …rms in three …rm markets without a merger history. In the case of two …rms, they produce slightly more. However, both observations can be reconciled by considering the behavior of the respective merged …rms. Given the average quantity of a merged …rm in the last third of "4!3", the unmerged …rms play almost exactly according to the Cournot solution for the resulting residual demand (which predicts 23.04 and compares to 22.62). Similarly, the unmerged …rms' best reply in the last third of "3!2" would be 31.33 which compares to an actual average of 31.25.
2 1 First third: p = :014 ("4!3") and p = :0325 ("3!2"). Last third: p = :087 ("4!3") and p = :23 ("3!2"); one-tailed Wilcoxon tests. 2 2 Treatment "4!3": …rst 3rd, p = :020; last third, p = :027. Treatment "3!2": …rst 3rd, p = :055; last third, p = :0995; one-tailed MWU tests.
Our experiments suggest that there is a behavioral asymmetry between …rms. The data indicate that merged …rms produce more and unmerged …rms yield to this more aggressive behavior. 23 A consequence of this asymmetry is that markets with a merger history are more concentrated than comparable markets in which a merger has never occurred. This shows nicely in Her…ndahl indices. While, in general, the indices are pretty close to the prediction, we …nd that triopolies that have resulted from a merger are signi…cantly more concentrated than triopolies without that history. 24 The latter average index is 3,450, the former average index is 3,950, a di¤erence signi…cant at a p-level of 1.9% (one-sided MWU). 25 We summarize our observations in the following
Result 5
Merged …rms produce more than their equilibrium share. Unmerged …rms choose, on average, Cournot quantities with respect to the residual demand, given the output of merged …rms. Accordingly, markets resulting from mergers tend to have greater Her…ndahl indices.
In the next subsection we supplement our analysis of individual di¤erence by a regression that indicates the quantitative e¤ects of merger history.
A panel model
In order to assess the explanatory power of merger history we estimate the following panel regression model:
where q it is the individual quantity set by …rm i in period t, º i is the subject-speci…c random error component and " it is the overall error component. The explanatory variables included are as follows. 2 3 The overall picture is quite similar to the original Stackelberg (1934) logic on which we will elaborate later. 2 4 Note, however, that increasing concentration is not necessarily associated with decreasing welfare. If concentration is caused by strategic market power, consumer rents may actually increase. See, for example, Daughety (1990) or Huck, Konrad, and Müller (2001). 2 5 Based on the last thirds of the …rst phase of treatment "3!2" and the last third of the second phase of treatment "4!3".
² T RI and QU AD are dummies for market size. Markets with n = 2 …rms are the reference group. T RI(opoly) is the dummy for market size n = 3 (i.e., T RI = 1 if n = 3 and T RI = 0 otherwise), and QUAD(ropoly) is the dummy for n = 4 (i.e., QUAD = 1 if n = 4 and QU AD = 0 otherwise).
² HIS(tory) is a dummy for merger history. That is, H IS = 0, if the decision stems from a round in phase 1 of the experiment (where no merger occurred) and HIS = 1 if the decision stems from a round in phase 2 of the experiment (where a merger has previously occurred in the market).
² F US(ion) is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the quantity is chosen by a …rm that emerged from fusion, i.e., we have F US = 1 in the case of a …rm that resulted from a merger and F US = 0 otherwise.
If …rms were choosing Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, the parameters ® 0 , ® 0 + ® 1 and ® 0 + ® 2 would equal the theoretical equilibrium quantities chosen in oligopolies with 2, 3 or 4 …rms, respectively, and the coe¢cients ® 3 and ® 4 would be equal to zero.
First we estimate the model without the dummy variables capturing market history and …rm type. The results are shown in the left column of Table 4 . Table 4 .
We make the following two observations:
1. The Nash equilibrium predictions for the numbers ® 0 ; ® 0 + ® 1 and ® 0 + ® 2 are 29.783, 24.36 and 19.358 respectively. Thus, whereas …rms produce on average a quantity below the equilibrium prediction in duopoly markets, in triopoly and quadropoly markets, …rms' individual quantities accurately match the equilibrium predictions.
2. While the coe¢cient ® 3 is negative but not signi…cant, the coe¢cient ® 4 is positive and both substantial as well as signi…cant. This con…rms that …rms that emerged from a merger produce considerably more than others.
GLS random-e¤ects panel regression 
Pro…ts
We next turn to the question how merger a¤ects the individual …rms' pro…ts. First of all, we consider the prediction of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) that Cournot mergers are not pro…table. Table 5 shows the average pro…ts of the two …rms involved in the merger for the last third prior to the merger, and for the …rst and last thirds after the merger. It also shows the theoretically expected pro…ts. In treatment "3!2" the merging …rms initially manage to sustain their pro…ts.
There is only a tiny insigni…cant di¤erence. However, in later rounds, the pro…t of the merged …rm falls by 7.8% which is signi…cant at p = 5:8% (one-sided Wilcoxon). A slightly di¤erent picture emerges in treatment "4!3". Here, the merging …rms initially increase their pro…ts by 14.6% to see them drop back roughly to the original level in the last phase of the experiment (and stay far above the predicted equilibrium pro…ts).
Thus, we …nd
Result 6 When two …rms merge in a market with three …rms, their pro…ts are eventually lower than in the pre merger market. When two …rms merge in a market with four …rms, they experience short-run gains while, in the long run, their pro…ts remain virtually una¤ected.
Finally, we turn to the pro…ts of the merging …rms' competitors. Theoretically, they are expected to rise. Table 6 shows the average pro…ts of the outside …rms for the same time intervals as above. Here, the qualitative prediction of the theory is fully con…rmed, although the two competitors of the merged …rm in treatment "4!3" are not able to reach Cournot pro…ts.
Result 7 Average pro…ts of outside …rms increase substantially and signi…cantly in both treatments. This is true in the short run as well as in the long run. Table 6 : Average pro…ts of the …rms not involved in the merger
Comparing Tables 5 and 6 we observe that, once the merger has taken place, …rms' pro…ts vary substantially even if we focus on the last third where the merged …rms earn considerably less than in the initial adjustment phase. In the duopoly which results from the merger in treatment "3!2", merged …rms earn on average 18.5% more than their competitors, in treatment "4!3" this …gure becomes even 49.7%. Statistically, only the latter di¤erence is signi…cant (p = 3:8%, one-sided Wilcoxon).
Merger psychology
While the results from our main treatment are clear, it is not easy to determine the correct explanation for them. Given the institutional details of our design, we …nd three plausible explanations for what we observe: (a) the mere fact that one …rm has resulted from a merger renders the …rm "strong" and the whole market asymmetric; (b) as the merged …rms are jointly owned (and pro…ts are to be shared), fairness considerations shift output from unmerged to merged …rms; (c) merged …rms are committed to maintaining their original pro…ts because of aspiration levels created in the pre merger markets.
In order to be able to discriminate between (a) on the one hand and (b) and (c) on the other, we conducted a treatment which we will refer to as "4!3GO". This treatment is identical to "4!3" with one exception: after the two …rms that merge are selected, and after one of the two participants involved is chosen as the manager of the newly merged …rm, the second subject does not remain in the laboratory and is sent away. This subject received, in addition to the earnings of the …rst phase, a ‡at payment of DM 10 and this was observed by all subjects. The remaining subject received the total pro…ts of the merged …rm. Again we conducted six markets. The hypothesis based on explanation (a) is that we should observe the same asymmetry between merged and unmerged …rms as in the main treatment. The alternative hypothesis, based on either (b) or (c), is that the di¤erences between merged and un-"4!3" "4!3GO" "3 + 1" Table 7 : Additional treatments: Total quantities merged …rms disappear. (b) makes this prediction as now all participants earn the same amount in equilibrium, also post merger. And (c) makes the same prediction as the sole owner of the newly merged …rm now makes higher pro…ts than before, i.e., pro…ts above his/her potential aspiration levels. (We will elaborate on the notion of aspiration levels in detail below.) The results of "4!3GO" are shown in Table 7 (total quantities) and Table 8 (individual quantities). From Table 7 , we observe that there are only slight di¤erences with respect to total output in treatments "4!3" and "4!3GO". For example, whereas total output in the last third before merger is 81.17 in treatment "4!3", it is 80.11 in treatment "4!3GO". Observed industry outputs in treatment "4!3GO" are slightly lower than in treatment "4!3", but these di¤erences are statistically not signi…cant. 28 Next, consider (average) individual quantity choices of merged and unmerged …rms in post merger situations as shown in Table 8 . The result is striking: whereas we …nd signi…cant and substantial di¤erences in individual output of merged and unmerged …rms in treatment "4!3" (see fact 1 in section 3.2), …rms in "4!3GO" are more or less symmetric after the merger. 29 This clearly rejects explanation (a). History alone cannot explain the more aggressive and quite successful behavior of merged …rms in our main treatment.
Thus, we are left with the fairness explanation (b) and/or the aspiration-levels explanation (c). To discriminate between them, we designed a further treatment which we will call "3 + 1". This treatment is identical with the second (post merger) phase of our main treatment "4!3". There is simply no …rst phase. 30 Thus, the treatment (individual quantities). We focus exclusively on the last third when behavior has settled down. Although not decisive for our two explanations, let us start by considering total quantities as shown in Table 7 . Total output in the last third of treatment "3 + 1"
is 75.38 and, thus, matches the Nash equilibrium prediction as closely as did the last third of the two other treatments.
Next consider (average) individual quantities as shown in Table 8 . We observe only a slight di¤erence between the jointly owned …rm and the two others. While the former produces on average an output of 26.98, the latter produce on average 24.20, roughly 10% less compared to roughly 25% in the main treatment. Moreover, the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant. Thus, we can also rule out the fairness explanation (b). Indeed, it seems that the success of mergers in our main treatment is driven by aspiration levels. Firm owners do not want to see their pro…ts fall. Merger history matters mainly because …rms form aspiration levels prior to the merger.
Aspiration levels, oligopoly, and merger
In the late 1950s and early 1960s the maximization paradigm in economics seemed for a while imperilled. With Herbert Simon leading the charge, the notion of satis…cing became a serious contender for a new paradigm. And, in contrast to much of (neo)classical theory, the building blocks that were envisaged to lay the foundation for a new theory were largely based on empirical (and often experimental) evidence. One of these building blocks was that what decision makers …nd satisfactory is a function of (i) outside comparisons and (ii) past experience. 31 In a fairly in ‡uential paper, Cyert and March (1956) applied the notion of satis…cing to oligopoly theory. They claimed that …rms are guided by an "acceptable-level pro…t norm" that is determined by experience and comparison. And, more importantly, they also provided empirical evidence for this claim. They found, for example, that …rms …ght harder to increase their sales if they experienced declining pro…ts. This is exactly what we observe.
Related to this is a small e¤ect we …nd in the messages that passive players could send to active players in the main treatments. In "4!3" it shows that the message "increase quantity" was only sent if …rms experienced in the prior round decreasing pro…ts (which accounts for 80% of all these messages) or constant pro…ts (which accounts for the remaining 20%). 32 Since the publication of Cyert and March's paper, more than forty years have passed during which models based on satis…cing became pretty unfashionable. Recently however, they have experienced a renaissance 33 that seems to be closely related to the rise of evolutionary and learning models.
Evolutionary and learning models share one important feature with models of aspiration levels: They are truly dynamic and at least as much concerned with (transient) adaptations as with (long-run) asymptotics. In fact, there are many models which combine ideas from the literature on evolution and learning with aspiration levels. Examples include Karandikar, Mookerherjee, Ray, and Vega-Redondo (1998) who study how satis…cing players achieve cooperation in 2x2 games; Posch (1999) who focuses on prisoners' dilemma games; 34 Kim (1999) who looks at common interest games; and 3 1 For early experimental evidence see, e.g., Simon, Shaw, and Gilchrist (1954). 3 2 Recall that the passive players were allowed to send messages in periods 7, 12, 17, and 22 of the second half. To analyse whether there are any other patterns in the messages we form groups based on the message sent. Then we compare the groups by analysing quantities, pro…ts and changes in both prior to the message. We …nd that …rms in which the passive player sent the "reduce quantity" message had a signi…cantly higher output than …rms where the passive player sent the "increase" message. This holds for both treatments. (The signi…cance levels are p = :02 for "3!2" and p = :05 for "4!3.") Also, we analyse whether active players followed their partners' recommendations. We …nd that they do so in 30 of 60 cases. If the message indicates a change, i.e., if it is not "stay", active players follow it in 21 out of 35 cases. 3 3 The Journal of Mathematical Psychology, for example, recently published a revised (and English) version of a classical German article by Sauermann and Selten (1962) on "aspiration adaptation theory" (Selten 1998 ). 3 4 His approach is closely related to Nowak and Sigmund (1993) who rediscover Thorndike's (1911) Börgers and Sarin (2000) who combine aspiration levels with reinforcement learning.
All these models have one feature in common, namely that aspiration levels depend only on own payo¤ experiences and not on comparisons. was purely behavioral. Stackelberg followers are …rms that react according to the Cournot best-reply logic while Stackelberg leaders are …rms that consider themselves stronger and, anticipating the "weakness" of followers, take strategic advantage of the adaptive behavior of their competitors and produce higher quantities. Our experiments suggest an explanation based on industry structure and aspiration levels for this behavioral asymmetry.
Here we do not want to develop a fully- ‡edged aspiration level-based theory of merger in oligopoly but we would like to highlight at least two implications our …ndings may have for markets outside the laboratory.
² Merger success might become a self-ful…lling prophecy. In a world where mergers are endogenous, …rms have to form believes about market outcomes post merger.
Hence, observing a voluntary merger, competitors might expect that the merging …rms want to sustain at least their original pro…ts. Otherwise they shouldn't win-stay, lose-shift strategy which, essentially, is based on aspiration levels and plays an important role in many new studies. 3 5 This is an application of Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1995) case-based decision theory which can be seen as an axiomatic foundation for satis…cing behavior. have merged. This argument is similar to forward-induction reasoning where past decisions convey information about future intentions (see, e.g., van Damme, 1989). As …rms have the (outside) option of simply continuing without a merger, the decision to merge conveys some vital information about their future plans.
If this works, as it largely did in our experiment, a merged …rm might sell more than its competitors even if …rms are otherwise completely symmetric. If …rms anticipate this kind of "merger psychology", they may very well go ahead and join forces.
² Merged …rms that nevertheless incur losses might be expected to use more aggressive pricing or marketing strategies than normally predicted. This hypothesis, it seems to us, should be genuinely testable with …eld data. For example, one could analyze whether merged …rms are more likely to start expensive advertising campaigns.
Conclusions
In the experiments reported in this paper, we imposed mergers in three and four …rm Cournot oligopolies. With respect to the two central economic questions-pro…tability and welfare-we …nd that theory predicts welfare e¤ects well. Based on the U.S. merger guidelines, the mergers in our experimental markets would probably have been challenged, and the signi…cant reduction of competition and welfare show that the guidelines would have been appropriate in these cases. With respect to pro…tability, theory largely fails. This is an immediate consequence of its failure at the level of individual behavior. Post merger markets are not symmetric. A likely explanation for this is that subjects form aspiration levels prior to the merger. Therefore, merged …rms produce a larger output compared to unmerged …rms, and unmerged …rms yield to the more aggressive behavior of merged …rms. As a result, in our experimental markets, a merger is something very di¤erent from the exit of a …rm even in symmetric Cournot oligopoly with constant marginal cost. Merger psychology plays an important role as …rms' market power is not perceived as being symmetric.
In the larger markets with initially four …rms, this behavioral asymmetry is su¢cient to render the merger pro…table in the short run, and to enable …rms to break even in the long run. So, in contrast to theory, …rms might have an incentive to merge even if there are no cost advantages from merging.
The second phase of the experiment consists again of 25 periods. While the two …rms which do not participate in the merger continue deciding about their output, only one of the two …rms participating the merger will decide about the output of the merged …rm. The other …rm participating in the merger can only send a message to the …rm which decides for the merged …rm at the beginning of the second period (and at the beginning of the 7th, 12th, 17th, and 22nd period). More precisely, this …rm can recommend producing "more", "less" or "as much as before". This message will not be sent to the …rms not participating in the merger. The decision about which of the two participants decides about output and who may send messages is again determined by a random computer choice. Note that the pro…ts of the merged …rms will be split equally. When you participate in a merger, you will get half the pro…t of the merged …rm.
All …rms, whether participating in a merger or not, will, from the second period on, in every period learn about the total output produced by the other …rms and about the individual output and pro…t of the previous period.
Again, all participants who have to decide about output may simulate their decisions in advance.
Your payment in the second phase consists of the earnings made in all periods.
